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Abstract 
Because defined-contribution systems expose pensions to a number 
of risks, reforming governments have often strictly regulated the 
pension fund industry’s structure, performance, and investments.  
This paper compares the rules in the new systems of Latin America 
and eastern Europe with richer OECD countries.  The authors 
argue that the benefits of competing pension funds and individual 
choice can only be achieved if regulations are loosened in the 
medium term. 
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Regulating private pension funds’ structure, 
performance and investments: 
cross-country evidence 
P.S. Srinivas, Edward Whitehouse and Juan Yermo 
‘Risk is risk.  It cannot be legislated away.  It can only be diversified away.’ 
George Russell, financier, quoted in de Ryck (1998) 
 
A number of countries have implemented or proposed fundamental reforms of their pension 
systems, including eight in Latin America and five in Europe1.  These reforms emphasise the role 
of individual, privately managed defined-contribution accounts, where the value of the pension 
benefit will depend on accumulated contributions and investment returns.  They are, by definition, 
fully funded.  The new pension plans substitute for the old, public, defined benefit schemes where 
the pension depended on some measure of earnings and years of coverage.  Public schemes are 
usually financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, where current workers’ contributions pay for current 
pensioners’ benefits.   
The new defined contribution systems expose workers’ future pension benefits to a number 
of different risks.  To try to mitigate these risks, reforming governments have often strictly 
regulated the pension fund management industry’s structure, performance, and asset allocation.  
Often, a new fund management industry has been established, consisting of multiple competing 
pension funds, separated from other financial institutions.  In the majority there are restrictions on 
the type of investments that can be made and sometimes regulations specify the returns that the 
funds should earn.   
These fundamental reforms of pension systems aim to:  
· enhance individual choice and responsibility through the freedom to select a fund manager; 
                                                 
1 Chile (1981), Peru (1993), Argentina (1994), Colombia (1994), Uruguay (1995), Bolivia (1997), Mexico (1998), El Salvador 
(1998), Czech Republic (1998), Hungary (1998), Poland (1999), Sweden (1999) and the United Kingdom (1988).  Schwarz 
and Demirguç-Kunt (1999) provide a global survey of pension reforms of the last six years.   
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· ensure good service and performance through competition between fund managers and so 
deliver reasonable pension benefits; and 
· limit risk through competition and investment restrictions. 
However, in practice, ‘Draconian’ regulation of pension funds has prevented the 
achievement of many of these objectives.  Regulations have generally focussed on three aspects: 
industry structure, asset allocation, and performance.  Structural regulations force workers to 
choose only one manager and one fund.  So, workers are unable to diversify investments across 
funds, exposing them to aberrant behaviour by fund managers, and preventing portfolio 
adjustments according to the individual’s age, household characteristics, career profile and attitude 
to risk.  Strict asset-allocation rules and relative performance criteria mean that pension funds 
often invest and perform almost identically, removing any substantive choice for workers over the 
allocation of their pension fund’s assets and the portfolio’s risk and returns.  
This paper provides evidence for some of the effects of structural, investment and 
performance regulation of pension funds in emerging economies and compares them with evidence 
from more developed OECD countries.  Concentration in the pension fund management industry 
is found to be higher in the new pension systems of Latin America and Eastern Europe than in 
most OECD countries.  Concentration might be because the new pension markets are smaller than 
in countries with more established funded pension systems, but it could also be because of 
restrictions on industry structure.  In Latin America, asset allocation and performance is nearly 
identical across pension funds.  So-called ‘herding’ behaviour is almost a defining characteristics of 
these pension regimes.  Again, this reflects, at least in part, asset allocation restrictions and strict 
performance regulation.  There is also evidence that pension funds have often under-performed 
simple portfolios composed of market indices of stocks and bonds.  
All the rules imposed in the new systems of Latin American and Eastern Europe2 seem to 
be more stringent than in the OECD, with one exception: portfolio limits.  Some OECD countries 
have a tighter investment regime than countries such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and 
Poland.  But OECD countries tend to have fewer barriers to entry and impose fewer constraints 
on performance than Latin American and Eastern European countries. 
                                                 
2 The countries in Europe considered are Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. These countries are actually part of the 
OECD, but for the purposes of the study they are discussed together with Latin American countries, because they have 
established very similar private pension industries. 
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 The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 1 reviews investment supervision 
and regulation in practice.  The subsequent section looks at risks in pension funds.  Sections 3, 4, 
and 5 review the adverse effects of structural, performance and portfolio restrictions respectively.  
Section 6 concludes.   
 
1. Pension funds, supervision and regulation 
Pension funds have shown an impressive growth pattern.  In Chile, which reformed its 
system in 1981, pension funds are the leading institutional investors, managing a total of $32 
billion at the end of 1997, worth some 44 per cent of GDP.  Only five countries have 
proportionally larger pension fund sectors — Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States — where funds average 75 per cent of GDP.  In these five 
countries, the value of funds has been growing rapidly: by 56 per cent between 1987 and 1996.3   
Intersec, a financial data firm, expects world pension fund assets, currently $11,000 billion, to 
grow by 40 per cent over the next five years.   
In other Latin American countries and in Eastern Europe, reforms were more recent, and 
so funds are much smaller.  The next largest system after Chile is Argentina, where assets are 
worth 3 per cent of GDP.  But funds in other countries are forecast to grow rapidly.  Goldman 
Sachs, an American investment bank, expects the value of Argentine funds to increase from 
$8.8bn in 1997 to $33bn in 2003, or 6.4 per cent of GDP.4   
Mexico has the largest number of workers covered by the new plans – about 14 million.  
Around 6 million workers each in Chile and Argentina, 2½ million in Colombia, just over 1 million 
in Peru and fewer than half a million in Bolivia and Uruguay are covered.5  In the United Kingdom, 
5.7 million workers (28 per cent of total employees) are covered by the new personal pensions.  A 
further 10 million are covered by longer-established employer-provided plans (of which more than 
90 per cent are defined benefit).  In Hungary, 800,000 workers have so far announced their 
intention to switch to the new funds.  Poland and Croatia will implement their reforms during 
1999.   
                                                 
3  OECD (1998), table V.1.   
4  Mariscal (1998a) 
5  However, only 54 per cent on average of these members actually contribute to the schemes, ranging from 44 per cent in 
Peru to 65 per cent in Mexico.  See Queisser (1998b).   
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In Hungary, Poland and most of the Latin American countries, a new agency was 
established to supervise the new pension funds.  The exceptions are in Colombia and Uruguay, 
where this responsibility falls on the Central Bank.6  These agencies ensure compliance with 
regulations on capital, disclosure and reporting, commissions, transfers between funds, rates of 
return and investment allocation.  In other countries, such as Australia, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom, existing financial regulators expanded to cover pension funds.   
 
2. Risks in pension funds 
Government intervention in markets can be justified by market failures.  In financial 
systems, externalities, asymmetric information and monopoly are the three main types of market 
failure.  Pension funds pose a different set of risks than other financial institutions, such as banks.  
Pensions are long-term contracts and they involve a sizeable proportion of the individual’s wealth.  
However, the existence of assets in pension funds avoids the danger of the type of runs that can 
occur in banking crises (i.e., externalities).  Monopoly, too, is likely to be less of a problem in the 
pension fund industry, as barriers to entry are low compared with banking.7   
Asymmetric information — the fact that it is costly for the buyer of financial services to 
obtain sufficient information to assess the quality of that service — is likely to be the most serious 
problem for pension funds.  Lack of information means that the buyer is vulnerable to fraud, 
negligence, incompetence and unfair treatment by the provider.  Clearly, the desire for providers to 
maintain a good reputation offers a high degree of protection, but there remain three risks in 
pension funds: 
· Systematic (undiversifiable) market risk: current generations cannot trade with unborn 
ones, so efficient intergenerational risk sharing cannot take place 
· Systemic risk: Asymmetric information problems in banking systems can lead to bank runs, 
and make financial systems fragile 
· Agency risks: in financial markets, trading often takes place between parties with different 
information, creating problems of moral hazard and adverse selection8 
                                                 
6  The issue of supervision is covered in Demarco, Rofman and Whitehouse (1998).   
7 See, however, section 5.1 below for evidence of high concentration in pension fund management in Latin America.  
Also, Altman (1992) shows the monopoly problem that arises with employer-provided plans.   
8 There is some overlap between the first and the other two forms of market failure risks. Whenever there are systemic 
and agency risks, systematic market risk for the investor is created.  
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Table 1 gives a taxonomy of these investment risks as they affect funded, defined 
contribution pensions plans.  It also shows the mechanisms to reduce risks that might be used and 
the new risks that might be created.  We describe these risks in turn.   
 
2.1 Systematic market risk 
Once market-based ways of reducing systematic risks (such as diversification and risk 
pooling) are exhausted, investors are left with some rate-of-return uncertainty.  This systematic 
market risk can only be reduced further through intergenerational risk sharing, pooling returns of 
investors across time.  Example policies include issuing indexed bonds or offering government 
guarantees.9  Some observers (such as Heller, 1998) have argued that the mandatory nature of the 
new pension systems means that governments retain a responsibility for ensuring adequate 
pensions beyond the guarantees specified by legislation, producing ‘contingent’ or ‘conjectural’ 
public-sector liabilities.  
Table 1.  A taxonomy of investment risks in pension funds 
Type of risk Example Risk reduction Example New risk created 
Non-systematic 
market risk 
Management 
inefficiency or 
inexperience (fund 
or industry specific) 
Portfolio 
diversification 
Diversification 
across countries or 
intermediaries 
 
Systematic market 
risk 
Global asset price 
volatility 
Government 
provides risk-
reducing 
instruments 
Inflation-indexed 
bonds 
Policy risk 
  Government 
guarantee 
Minimum pension 
or real rate of return 
guarantee 
Agency risk/moral 
hazard 
Policy risk 
Systemic risk Banking crisis Prudential 
regulation 
Capital adequacy Policy risk 
  Government 
guarantee 
Deposit insurance Agency risk/moral 
hazard 
Policy risk 
Agency risk Prudential 
regulation 
Diversification, 
limits on self-
investment 
Policy risk 
 
Moral hazard: 
fraud, pension mis-
selling, excessively 
risky investments 
Adverse selection: 
reasonably priced 
insurance not 
universally available 
Government 
guarantee 
Compensation Agency risk/moral 
hazard 
 
                                                 
9  Defined-benefit pensions might also reduce this kind of risk, but exposes the worker to other forms of uncertainty 
over, for example, job tenure and earnings profiles  (see Disney and Whitehouse, 1994 and 1996 and Bodie, Marcus and 
Merton, 1988). 
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Government intervention in the form of guarantees may not necessarily be a panacea for 
risk.  Guarantees create a moral-hazard problem: for example, a pension guarantee creates an 
incentive for informal sector workers to contribute to the system for the minimum number of years 
to qualify for the minimum pension.  Investment managers may take excessive risks knowing that 
the member’s pension is underwritten by the government.  In general, guarantees reduce one type 
of risk but may increase others.  
 
2.2 Systemic risks 
Investment in capital markets depends crucially on the option to exit into the safe-haven of 
liquid money markets.  If banks take excessive risks, impairing their solvency, the solidity of the 
whole financial system is put at risk by the potential for a run on the banks.  Hence, a sound 
banking system and a secure pension system go hand in hand.   
The regulatory framework should ensure that the moral hazard from deposit guarantees is 
mitigated.  Latin American countries are still trying to make accounting and supervisory standards 
stringent enough to evaluate risks more effectively than in the past (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 
1996).  
 
2.3 Agency risks 
Intervention to limit agency risks takes the form of prudential rules and guarantees applied 
to financial markets and intermediaries generally, not just to pension funds.  This framework 
includes aims to  
· avoid fraud through setting accounting and auditing standards, information disclosure and 
insider trading rules 
· reduce overexposure to specific risks by requiring minimum levels of diversification by issuer 
and security 
· mitigate conflicts of interest through limits on self-investment 
· limit market power by restricting concentration of share ownership 
Government might also choose to go further and guarantee individuals against these risks. 
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The contrast between the regulatory regime for pension funds and other financial 
intermediaries in many developing countries is startling.  While pension funds are subject to strict 
prudential controls, such as capital, disclosure, fiduciary and diversification standards 
requirements, the regulatory and supervisory framework of other financial institutions is often 
weak.  Valuation is also a widespread problem.  The strengthening of prudential controls is a basic 
precondition for the successful development of financial markets and expanding the investment 
universe of pension funds.  
 
3. Regulating industry structure 
In Latin America and Eastern Europe, reforming countries restricted the industry structure 
in three ways 
· investment was limited to one instrument, the specially created private pension accounts 
· administration of funds was restricted to companies exclusively dedicated to pension fund 
management and managers were restricted to one fund each 
· ownership of pension fund managers was not open to existing financial institutions in some 
countries (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru) 
The structure of the industry in many reforming countries is limited to specially created 
pension fund managers, which must be independent of other financial institutions.  Colombia is 
one exception: severance funds were allowed to manage pensions as long as this activity was kept 
separate from other businesses.  But in other countries, too, there are strong economic ties 
between pension fund managers and other companies.  For example, Maxima, the largest fund in 
Argentina, has Banco Quilmes, the Argentine subsidiaries of Deutsche Bank and HSBC (two of 
the world’s largest banks) and New York Life as shareholders.   
Pension fund managers are usually restricted to pensions-related activities, such as 
collecting contributions, asset management, reporting results, and benefit payments.  Associated 
activities — such as custody of assets, provision of life and disability insurance, etc. — are often 
carried out by separate institutions for economic or prudential financial reasons.  In Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, each manager may usually administer only one fund. In Poland, the 
regulations allow managers to offer two funds from 2005: one with a relatively liberal investment 
régime, the other restricted to fixed-income securities.  In Mexico too, the regulations contemplate 
allowing more than one fund some time in the future. 
 12
In most OECD countries, in contrast, pension plans are offered by a variety of different 
providers.  In some, employers play an important role.  In Ireland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, employer schemes are a mix of defined benefit and defined contribution.  Larger 
schemes tend to be managed ‘in-house’, while smaller plans contract out fund management to 
specialist financial institutions.  The investment of defined-benefit schemes is, of course, of less 
concern to members than defined-contribution.  Other countries with predominantly defined-
benefit coverage include Belgium, Finland, France and Germany.   
In the United States, around half of employer-provided pension coverage is now defined-
contribution.  So-called 401(k) schemes (named after the relevant clause of the income tax 
legislation) cover 37 million workers.  They now account for 39 per cent of the total of pension 
fund members, 29 per cent of assets and 53 per cent of new contributions.10  Typically, the 
employer selects the range of investment options in 401(k)s, but they are generally broad, 
including equity, bond and money-market funds. 
In Denmark and the Netherlands, the pension system is based on industry-wide schemes.  
There are 35 funds in Denmark, and the number of single-employer schemes has now declined to 
around 100.  There are 65 compulsory industry-wide funds in the Netherlands, of which 95 per 
cent are defined-benefit.  In contrast, pensions in Denmark are defined-contribution.  Dutch 
companies are free to opt out of these plans if they offer their own scheme with equivalent 
benefits.  There are around 1,000 of these single-employer plans.   
Australia’s new superannuation system is based around compulsory employer-provided 
defined-contribution schemes.11  Initially, the employer decided where contributions were 
invested.  However, the government is proposing that employers be required to offer a minimum 
of five different funds.  Already, 15 of the 24 largest funds offer a menu of investment strategies.   
The market for individual pension accounts in OECD countries usually involves a wide 
range of financial intermediaries.  In the United Kingdom, for example, there are around 90 
providers of personal pensions, including most life insurers and banks.  They offer an average of 
around 8 funds each, and individuals are free to divide their assets between different funds.12  
 
                                                 
10  VanDerhei (1999). 
11  See Flanagan (1999) and Edey and Simon (1996).   
12  Dilnot et al. (1994). 
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3.1 Rationale 
The restrictions in the Latin American and Eastern European regimes are designed to keep 
the regulation and supervision of the industry simple, avoiding the complexity of multiple 
instruments and funds.  The poor performance of some existing financial intermediaries led to the 
decision to establish a new industry.  But this poor performance could only result either from poor 
market or economic performance, or from inadequate regulation.  In the first case, there is no a 
priori reason to expect the new pension funds to perform any better.  The second case justifies 
improvements in the existing regulatory framework, not necessarily the creation of another.  
Moreover, if the previous regulatory failure resulted from some systematic, cultural failure of 
governance, there is no reason to expect the new regime to be any better.   
In addition to being simpler to regulate, restrictions on the structure of the pension market 
makes the system easier for participants to understand.  This is probably an advantage initially, as 
the new régime offers people new choices.  However, as people become accustomed to the new 
system, this simplicity is less important.   
 Limiting managers to one fund avoids the moral-hazard risk generated by minimum 
pension guarantees.  If a manager were able to ‘stream’ low-income workers into one fund, they 
could then take ‘wild bets’ in high risk/high return assets knowing that the government insures the 
worker.   
Excluding existing financial intermediaries, such as mutual funds and banking 
conglomerates, from the new pensions industry is common in countries with weak banking systems 
or poor past mutual-fund performance.  The aim of the restrictions was to protect retirement 
savings from deficiencies in existing financial institutions, often in the form of agency risks that 
were not checked by the existing regulatory and supervisory system. In some countries, these 
restrictions were also designed to reduce the market power of these intermediaries.  The 
mandatory nature of pension contributions in many countries increases the government’s 
responsibility for the safety of pension assets.   
Some OECD countries which also have mandatory private pension pillars also impose a 
single instrument requirement. In France, Switzerland, Finland and Australia employers are obliged 
to set-up pension plans for their employees. There is, however, more flexibility, because asset 
management may be carried by a variety of financial institutions. In the reforming countries, only 
licensed pension fund administrators are allowed to manage the funds. 
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3.2 Adverse effects of structural regulations 
The most important adverse effect of structural regulation is that it prevents 
diversification. Workers are unable to spread retirement savings across different financial 
intermediaries and different financial products. Hence, non-systematic market risk (the risk of 
aberrant behaviour by a specific fund manager or investment instrument) is not pooled away. Such 
risk could be easily diversified away if workers were able to invest in various funds at the same 
time, though this may raise administrative costs significantly. Also, to the extent that governments 
impose relative performance rules, and guarantee such performance, these constraints may not be 
worrying. Some countries, however, do not have performance rules, and in some cases require 
investors to remain with a specific fund for up to six months before they can transfer to a new one. 
In these cases, governments will probably be forced to bear the responsibility for funds which 
consistently underperform the industry. 
Another adverse effect arises because excluding existing financial intermediaries precludes 
the use of existing infrastructure and the potential benefits of economies of scale, raising 
administrative costs. Instead, investors have to finance the set-up costs of the new industry 
through fees and commissions (Shah, 1997).   
The restriction of one fund per administrator also has significant costs.  Workers cannot 
choose the optimal portfolio that best suits their age, career earnings path, and risk aversion.  For 
example, younger workers have few assets other than their human capital (i.e. their future 
earnings).  It is optimal for them to hold assets with a low correlation with their projected wages.13  
It may also be better for younger workers to weight their portfolio towards equities, which have a 
higher long-run return but also a higher short-term risk, whereas older workers prefer a less risky, 
bond-weighted portfolio.14  Furthermore, workers of a given age will also vary in a range of 
characteristics, such as occupation and industry and family type, which affect their attitudes to 
risk.  They will also differ in the types of other assets that they hold: housing, durable goods and 
                                                 
13 See Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996).  This is a key attraction of defined-contribution plans over defined-benefit 
which also tie the worker’s pension to future earnings.  See Disney and Whitehouse (1994, 1996) and Bodie, Marcus and 
Merton (1988).   
14 Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (1998) suggest that liquidity constraints prevent younger workers from 
investing as much as they should in equities.  This behaviour in turn may help explain the ‘equity premium’ or the excess 
risk-adjusted return observed on equities compared with short-term government bonds.  A defined-contribution pension 
could alleviate this problem, if workers have some control over their portfolio.  See also Blanchard (1993), Jagannathan and 
Kocherlakota. (1996) and Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
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liquid assets, such as equities, bonds or deposits.  The ‘one-size-fits-all’ portfolio that results from 
these restrictions means workers are unable to reap the benefits of diversification. 
Finally, the structural constraints can behave as barriers to entry in the pension fund 
industry, limiting competition, and raising administrative costs. This, however, is a very 
controversial effect, since industry competition and administrative costs is affected by many 
factors, like the size of the industry, the stage of development of capital markets, and the ability of 
workers to switch between funds. 
 
3.3 Issues in member choice of investments 
The structural constraint that has received most attention is the limit of one fund per 
administrator. In order to ensure an adequate degree of matching between investor preferences and 
the portfolio chosen by the funds, the solution would be to liberalise the investment market to give 
employees choice over how their pension fund is invested.   
The main counter-argument is one of cost and complexity.  Dividing individual pension 
contributions between different funds (even when they are offered by the same manager) and 
transferring investments between funds on members’ request adds significantly to the 
administrative burden.  Providing information on different investment options and educating 
workers about investment choice would also be expensive.   
There is also the risk that workers make the ‘wrong’ choices.  Many studies of member-
directed investment in 401(k) plans in the United States have found evidence for ‘reckless 
conservatism’, with people investing the majority of their fund in low-risk, low-return 
instruments.15   
Figure 1 (and Table A.1 in the Appendix) show the allocation of 401(k) investments from a 
large survey covering 18 per cent of 401(k) members.16  Overall, nearly 70 per cent of funds are 
invested in equities, with 15 per cent in bond or money-market funds and 15 per cent in 
                                                 
15  Regulations protect plans and sponsoring employers from fiduciary responsibilities if members are allowed a 
sufficiently broad choice of investments with different risk and return characteristics.  The vast majority of plans intend to 
comply with these regulations, allowing members to choose investments (94 per cent of schemes covering 92 per cent of 
members according to survey data: KPMG Peat Marwick, 1998). 
16  VanDerhei et al. (1999).  Earlier studies used much smaller data sets.  These include Yaboboski and VanDerhei (1996), 
who looked at 180,000 members with three large employers.  Goodfellow and Schieber (1997) analysed 36,000 participants 
in 24 schemes.  Other papers have investigated investment choices in the Thrift Savings Plan (a defined-contribution scheme 
for federal employees) — Hinz, McCarthy and Turner (1997) — and in TIAA-CREF (a plan for teachers and college 
professors) — Ameriks, King and Warshawsky (1997).   
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guaranteed investment contracts.  The pattern with age seems prudent.  Older workers tend to 
reduce the proportion in equities and increase the allocation to bond and money-market funds and 
guaranteed investment contracts.  These contracts, provided by insurance companies, provide for a 
‘holding period’ during which a fixed rate of return is paid, guaranteed for the life of the contract.  
Withdrawals can be made at book value to provide benefits.   
There are, however, some important divergences from prudent investment.  First, the large 
allocation to the stock of the employer: 28 per cent of the total invested in equities or 19 per cent 
of the total fund.  A more diverse portfolio would be more sensible.  Indeed, given individuals’ 
future employment and wages are already dependent on the performance of their employer, any 
investment in the employer’s stock seems imprudent.   
There is also evidence that a substantial minority are very conservative.  Fifteen per cent of 
people have no equity investments at all, even though balanced funds or their own employer’s 
stock.  Although this may be a rational strategy for people in their 60s (25 per cent of whom have 
no equity investments), it certainly is not for people in their 20s (of whom 15 per cent avoid equity 
investments).   
Figure 1.  Asset allocation in member-directed 401(k) pension plans 
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Note: investment in balanced funds is allocated 60 per cent to equities and 40 per cent to bonds, in line 
with the Investment Company Institute’s data for the average balanced mutual fund 
Source: VanDerhei et al. (1999) 
 
In all, however, it is likely that workers would benefit from some degree of choice, like the 
two funds of the Polish system, where one fund is invested in a ‘balanced’ manner, and the other is 
more conservative. The need for at least two portfolios becomes more apparent when one looks 
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into the future. As the new pension systems mature, older workers that are close to their 
retirement have a high preference for a conservative portfolio. 
 
3.4 Empirical evidence of concentration in fund management 
Figure 2 shows the degree of concentration in the pension fund industry in Latin America 
and, for comparison, in the liberalised fund management market of the United Kingdom.  The 
curves show the cumulative percentage of funds under management moving downwards from the 
largest fund.  (Appendix Table A.2 gives detailed data.) 
The pattern in Latin America is remarkably similar, particularly between Chile and 
Argentina.  The largest firm in Argentina, Chile and Mexico accounts for around 20-25 per cent of 
total assets, with the top three holding over half of funds, and the top five, around three-quarters.  
The situation is similar in Colombia, Peru and Uruguay (not shown in the Figure), where the 
largest three firms cover 60-75 per cent of total members.17  Bolivia has licensed only two funds.   
The situation is very similar in Hungary, although 45 funds were licensed initially.  The 
three-firm concentration ratio for mandatory funds is 57 per cent, and the five-firm ratio, 71 per 
cent.  The voluntary pension sector is a little less concentrated.  The three-firm ratio is 46 per cent 
and the five-firm ratio, 66 per cent.  These ratios are exactly the same for voluntary funds in the 
Czech Republic.   
The fund management industry in the United Kingdom is significantly less concentrated 
than in Latin America.  Prudential takes just 8 per cent of the market, with under a quarter of 
funds for the top three and a little over a third for the top five.  Even the top 15 only accounts 
only for around three-quarters of funds.  These funds include both individual’s personal pensions 
and externally managed accounts for employer-provided pension plans.  The largest employer fund 
managing its own assets — Hermes, which runs the pension schemes for the Post Office and 
British Telecommunications — would rank 15-20th.   
Other sectors of the pension market in the United Kingdom are more concentrated.  
Employer-provided plans where funds are managed externally rely mainly on just five fund 
managers.  A recent Pensions and Investments survey in the United States found a five-firm 
concentration ratio of 20 per cent and a 20-firm ratio of 40 per cent, significantly below even the 
United Kingdom figures of 36 and 72 per cent respectively. 
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In both Chile and Argentina, there has been substantial recent consolidation in the pension 
funds industry.  In 1994, there were 26 funds in Argentina, falling to 18 at the beginning of 1998 
and 15 after three recent mergers (see the notes to the Appendix Table).  In Chile, there were 21 
funds in 1994, 13 at the beginning of 1998 and 10 now.  Mexico has also experienced substantial 
consolidation, despite the relative infancy of its private pension fund industry. The number of fund 
managers has fallen from 17 in 1997 to 13 at present and some more mergers are expected soon. In 
other Latin American countries, reforms were more recent and there were fewer funds initially (e.g., 
nine in Colombia, five in Peru, six in Uruguay, and two in Bolivia).  Hence, it is not surprising that 
there has been little consolidation in these counties.  Consolidation has already begun in Hungary, 
where the majority of the 45 funds are very small.  Hungária has already absorbed five of the 
smallest funds.  Poland expects to have 10-12 funds after two years, although regulators expect to 
license more funds initially.   
An important policy question is to whether the concentration in reforming countries is due 
to entry restrictions and structural regulations or is a natural consequence of the size of the market, 
the efficiency of capital markets, and the ability of workers to switch between fund managers. In 
addition, the impact of concentration on industry competition, administrative costs, quality of 
service and capital markets should be explored. 
 
Figure 2.  Concentration curves for fund managers  
in Latin America and the United Kingdom 
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Source: Pension fund regulators in Latin America, HSBC James Capel for United Kingdom 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
17  See Queisser (1998), chapter 4. 
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4. Regulating performance 
Some countries — Chile, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, and Colombia — require pension 
funds to achieve rates of return above a prescribed minimum, typically related to the industry 
average (Table 4).  Argentina and Chile define their profitability band in relative terms: the 
minimum of 2 percentage points and 50 per cent (Chile) or 70 per cent (Argentina) above or below 
the average annual return of the industry18.  The supervisory agency monitors compliance with the 
minimum on a monthly basis.  All fund managers have to establish a reserve fund with their own 
capital (invested in the same way as the pension fund).  If the reserve is insufficient to top up the 
fund’s return to the minimum, the government guarantees the minimum. 
In Peru the minimum return is calculated in the same way as Argentina and Chile, but is 
not guaranteed by the government.  There is no maximum return: the ceiling was eliminated in 
November 1996.  There are also plans to move to a rate-of-return rule based on performance over 
five years.  In Uruguay, the guarantee is expressed in both absolute and relative terms.  The state-
managed fund guarantees a minimum real return of 2 per cent a year, while private pension 
managers have to create a guarantee fund (similar to the reserve fund in Argentina and Chile).  
This fund is drawn down if the return falls below the average of the industry by more than 2 
percentage points.  There is also a limit on the maximum return that funds can earn.  Because the 
state managed fund — República — dominates the market average (56 per cent of total assets in 
May 1998), other pension funds are also forced to reach the 2 per cent real return.  In Colombia, 
the minimum return is calculated as the arithmetic average of the return of the pension fund 
industry over three years and the return over three years of a market portfolio19.  No ceiling is 
placed on the returns.  The regulator checks compliance with the stipulated minimum return on a 
three-month basis. 
 
Table 4.  Pension fund performance regulations and  
government guarantees in Latin America 
 Minimum rate of return Maximum rate of return Government guarantee 
Argentina relative to average relative to average yes 
Bolivia —— —— no 
                                                 
18 Chile is considering changing the application of the rule to a 36-month rolling basis. 
19 From 1 July 1995, the composition of the market portfolio is (percentage of total pension industry assets invested in 
shares x 90 per cent of the average rate of return of the three stock exchanges in the country) + (percentage of total industry 
assets not invested in shares x 95 per cent of rate of return of a fixed-income index).  As of June 1998, only 5 per cent of 
industry assets were invested in equities, so the market portfolio is mainly a fixed-income index. 
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Chile relative to average relative to average yes 
Colombia relative to markets —— yes 
El Salvador relative to average relative to average yes 
Mexico —— —— no 
Peru (relative to average) 
2 per cent for República 
—— no 
Uruguay relative to average relative to average yes 
Note: Maximum removed in Peru in November 1996.  Minimum legislated but regulations not yet issued 
Source: Pension fund regulators 
 
Poland will place a lower limit of 50 per cent of the pension funds’ average returns or four 
percentage points below the average.  There will not be an upper limit.  Hungary regulates the 
pension funds’ performance relative to benchmark indices.20   
Unlike asset restrictions, performance regulation is rare outside the privatised Latin 
American pension systems.  In Brazil, non-occupational private pensions must deliver a minimum 
real return of 6 per cent.  In Singapore and Switzerland, minimum nominal returns of 4 and 2½ per 
cent respectively are imposed.  But these are all absolute not relative limits, and are likely to be 
more damaging, since they encourage fixed-income investments, particularly when the guarantee 
applies to a short period.   
 
4.1 Rationale 
Performance regulation is normally encountered in non-competitive industries, such as 
utilities.  Asset management, in contrast, is a competitive business and barriers to entry are fairly 
low.  Investors are typically able to diversify away fund manager risk by investing in various funds. 
In the pension systems of Latin America, however, affiliates may only invest in a single fund 
managed by a specific fund manager. Since investment in pension funds is mandatory, individuals 
can neither avoid nor diversify away fund manager risk. In some countries, workers may not even 
transfer between funds within a specified period, which can be as long as six months. Performance 
rules ensure that the worker does not suffer from the exposure to this diversifiable, non-systematic 
risk. 
 
                                                 
20  Chlon, Gora and Rutkowski (1998) and Palacios and Rocha (1998). 
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4.2 Adverse effects of performance regulation 
The main adverse effect of performance regulation is to exacerbate ‘herding’ behaviour 
(Vittas, 1998b and Queisser, 1998a).  Smaller fund managers behave like Stackelberg followers 
(Tirole, 1988), choosing portfolios similar to the larger funds, which have a greater weight in the 
industry average return.  Free from intense rate-of-return competition, the larger funds have an 
incentive to opt for lower risk-return assets, such as deposits and bonds.   
Return ceilings (as in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador and Uruguay) generate moral hazard in 
fund managers.  At a given level of risk, there is no incentive to achieve a return above the ceiling 
and so the optimal point in the portfolio efficiency frontier might not be reached.  Since returns no 
longer serve as a benchmark for comparing schemes, funds compete through advertising and 
marketing campaigns.  The costs are passed on to consumers in the form of higher commissions. 
Portfolio homogeneity can be explained by other factors.  First, the limit of one fund per 
manager forces them all to have a similarly balanced portfolio.  Secondly, illiquidity of markets 
also encourages concentration of asset choice, as funds cannot easily take advantage of buying or 
selling opportunities.  Thirdly, ‘yardstick’ competition, where managers measure their performance 
relative to their competitors, is entrenched even in countries with liberal regimes.  Fourthly, an 
institution’s trading decisions have informational content, which can be observed by its 
competitors and inferences drawn.  Fifthly, fund managers tend to react in the same way to market 
news (e.g., the issue of macroeconomic data).  Finally, the prudent-person legislation seems to be 
worded in a way that encourages herding.  The United States rules say managers must invest “with 
the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
person, acting in a like capacity and familiar with such mattes would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims”. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 goes further than common law.  It is not sufficient to be a careful amateur: managers must 
act as a prudent professional, experienced and educated in financial matters.  
Trustees of employer-provided pension plans surveyed in the United Kingdom reported 
that they took four main factors into account when determining investment policy: historic returns 
of different assets, the financial position of the scheme (the relationship between assets and 
defined-benefit liabilities), the scheme’s maturity.  Finally, and most important for our purposes, 
trustees said they took into account the asset allocation of other schemes.  Indeed, the majority 
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said they remained close to the average portfolios measured by WM (World Markets) or Combined 
Actuarial Performance Services (CAPS).21 
However, compared with countries with prudent-person regulations, the degree of 
similarity in Latin American portfolios is much greater.  Workers end up with practically identical 
portfolios, whichever their choice of manager. 
 
4.3 Empirical evidence of herding 
Herding has become almost a defining characteristic of the pension fund industry in Latin 
America.  Table 5 shows the mean and standard deviations of portfolio weightings of different 
assets in Chile.  In equities, for example, the mean share of the portfolio is 29.4 per cent and the 
standard deviation is just 1.6.   
 
Table 5.  The herding effect in Chile 
(per cent of assets of pension funds) 
Asset Average weighting Standard deviation 
Government bonds 39.4 4.3 
Equities 29.4 1.6 
Mortgage credit bills 16.8 3.9 
Bank instruments 5.3 2.9 
Corporate bonds 5.1 1.7 
Source: Queisser (1998) 
 
The principal effect of herding is to generate very similar returns between different funds.  
Table 6 summarises the correlation in returns across pension funds in Argentina, Chile and Peru 
from the inception of their systems until May 1998.  The average correlation between pairs of 
funds is exceptionally high: 0.98 in Chile, 0.93 in Peru and 0.87 in Argentina.  Since these 
countries have the most flexible regimes, the figures for the other countries are unlikely to be very 
different.   
 
                                                 
21  Pratten and Satchell (1998).  See also Bunt, Winterbotham and Williams (1998).   
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Table 6.  Correlation of pension fund returns 
Country Mean Range 
Argentina 0.94 0.72-0.94 
Chile 0.98 0.97-0.99 
Peru 0.93 0.88-0.96 
Note: Based on annualised monthly returns.  Includes only 
companies operating throughout the period 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from 
Superintendencias de Administradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones. 
 
Studies of other countries include Lakonishok et al. (1991) on the United States and Blake, 
Lehman and Timmerman (1997) on the United Kingdom.  Pension funds in the United States 
invest mainly in the equities of large companies: they own 25 per cent of the stockmarket as a 
whole, but 55 per cent of the largest 100 companies.22   
 
4.4 Performance regulation and herding 
The link between performance regulation and herding is controversial.  Ramirez Tomic 
(1997) found that herding by Chilean pension funds had (perversely) decreased slightly after the 
fluctuation band around the minimum rate of return was narrowed.  Valdés-Prieto and Ramirez 
(1999) revised Ramirez Tomic’s figures, showing that the width of the band caused a statistically 
significant but very small increase in the degree of herding among Chilean pension funds.  
To investigate the impact of return ceiling on herding, we take a closer look at the case of 
Peru, which eliminated its upper band in November 1996.  Until then, the constraint on the return 
was 50 per cent above or below the industry average.  The removal of the upper limit might be 
expected to lead to greater dispersion of investment across asset classes, as a wider range of risks 
can now be taken.  However, Table 7 shows that the opposite occurred.  After the regulation 
changed, the squared deviations from the industry averages for the largest asset classes, such as 
equities and government bonds, fell.  This suggests that removing upper limits on performance 
does not provide adequate incentive for taking greater risks than the industry average.  A more 
definitive analysis will be possible when data from countries without portfolio limits, such as 
Bolivia and Mexico, becomes available.   
 
                                                 
22  Monks (1992) and Brancato (1994). 
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Table 7.  Peru: Average pension fund portfolio and standard 
deviation, 1995-8 
 Industry Average Standard deviation 
 1995-96 1997-98 1995-96 1997-98 
Government bonds 27.5 3.8 2.5 1.1 
Corporate bonds 6.2 14.8 1.7 1.7 
Bank securities 21.9 16.5 1.8 1.3 
Time deposits 27.5 27.1 1.4 1.4 
Shares 16.1 37.3 1.5 0.7 
Mortgage-backed 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.2 
Average   1.2 0.8 
Note: Data are squared deviation from quarterly industry average, 
averaged over the periods (March 1995-March 1996) and March 1997-March 
1998) and square-rooted. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Superintendencia de 
Administrados de Fondos de Pensiones 
 
It is possible that other regulations (such as the limit of one fund per manager) and the 
structure of capital markets (for example, the supply of liquid investments) are more important 
than performance regulation in explaining herding and the lack of portfolio diversity.  What is 
certain is that performance regulations have reduced — and indeed almost eliminated — the risk 
of below industry-average performance by specific fund managers to the point where all workers 
obtain a similar return, irrespective of their choice of pension fund.  The result is that there is no 
real choice between different asset managers, and no performance reason for transferring between 
managers.   
Despite this, transfers in many reforming countries have been running at very high rates.  In 
Chile, for example, 29 per cent of members transferred in 1997.  In Argentina, regulations designed 
to reduce transfers have been introduced, which cut the annualised transfer rate from 18 per cent 
in December 1997 to 5 per cent in January 1998.  Since then, however, the rate has increased 
again, but only to 7½ per cent.  Chile is currently looking at reducing transfers by allowing funds to 
cut charges for long stayers.  Poland has adopted such a policy as a way of limiting transfers.  With 
little difference in portfolios between funds, this transfer process is, at least in part, wasteful.  And 
the marketing costs of wooing and keeping new members, including, in Chile, now-banned 
practices such as gifts and promotions, an indication of the degree of waste.  Sweden is to adopt a 
‘clearing-house’ system to try and limit direct marketing.  Contributions will be collected centrally 
and allocated to chosen fund managers, but the managers will not know the identity of their 
members.  This will not, however, preclude indirect marketing and promotional expenditure.   
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5. Regulating asset allocation 
Pension fund investments in all countries in Latin America are tightly controlled.  Almost 
all countries’ regulations include five types of limits 
· by asset class (a ceiling on the proportion of specific assets classes in a fund’s portfolio); 
· by concentration of ownership (a ceiling on the proportion of the issue of a company that a 
given fund can hold); 
· by issuer (a ceiling on the proportion of assets in a fund’s portfolio issued by the same 
institution); 
· by security (a ceiling on the proportion of individual securities in a fund’s portfolio); 
· by risk (a minimum acceptable risk rating of securities). 
The last four types of controls are a form of prudential regulation, similar to those of other 
institutional investors, like mutual funds.  All countries impose restrictions on concentration by 
ownership, by issuer and by security.23  In addition, most reforming countries have restricted the 
securities eligible for investment to those that have been risk rated. In Chile, the minimum 
acceptable risk category for fixed-income securities is BBB or equivalent.  The law requires all 
investments — not just fixed-income securities — to be rated.  This rating system for stocks has 
meant that only 30, mainly blue chip companies, out of a total of approximately 300 listed were 
eligible for pension fund investment until 1997.  The new capital market reform bill, approved in 
1997, extended coverage to more than 200 companies with smaller capitalisation and to other 
financial instruments, such as project financing, securitised bonds and venture capital.   
Concentration of ownership is limited in Chile through ceilings on the proportion of a 
firm’s bond or share issue that any fund can hold, currently 20 and 7 per cent respectively.  
Minimum diversification requirements are also imposed, limiting funds to 7 per cent of fixed-
income securities and 5 per cent of shares from the same issuer.  To avoid conflicts of interest, the 
limits are set lower for issuers that have financial interests in the pension fund managing 
companies.  There are similar prudential rules elsewhere.  
                                                 
23  Exceptions include the large balances invested by 401(k) participants in the United States in their employer’s stock (see 
Table 2 above).  Reserve funding systems, such as those in Germany, Japan and Luxembourg are equivalent to investing  all 
of the fund in the sponsoring employer’s equity.   
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In addition to these prudential rules, some countries also impose direct constraints on asset 
allocation. Countries tend to take two approaches to regulation of asset allocation, which Vittas 
(1996) describes as ‘Draconian’ and ‘relaxed’.  The latter refers to countries that apply the 
‘prudent-person’ principle as described in section 4.2.  (Countries with few or no restrictions on 
investments are listed at the top of Appendix Table A.3.)24  
Secondly, countries which impose limits, usually either a minimum investment in public 
bonds (between 15 and 50 per cent of total assets) or a maximum in equities (between 20 and 30 
per cent of total assets), including Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Norway, Portugal and 
Switzerland.  
Other countries have quantitative limits on investments in particular assets or asset 
classes.  (These are listed countries in the lower panel of Appendix Table A.3.)  For example, 
around half of OECD countries have limits on foreign investments, averaging around 16 per cent 
of total funds (Figure 3).  Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and France impose a minimum investment 
in bonds (Figure 4).  Six countries limit equity holdings (Figure 4, again) and eight, investment in 
property.   
 
Figure 3.  Limits on foreign investments in OECD countries 
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24  See Blommenstein (1998), Davis (1995) and OECD (1998), chapter V.   
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Figure 4.  Limits on domestic investments in OECD countries 
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The portfolio restrictions imposed by regulators in May 1998 in seven Latin American 
countries are summarised in Figure 5 and shown in detail in Appendix Table A.4.  In some 
countries, although legislation allows a more liberal investment regime, regulators have imposed 
tighter restrictions.  In Chile and Bolivia, the law establishes a band for the ceiling by asset class. 
The regulator must then fix the ceiling within the value of the band.  In Argentina, the law only 
sets out portfolio maxima.  For example, the ceiling on equities is 50 per cent by law, but the 
regulator permits only 35 per cent of the fund to be invested in this asset class. 
All countries have tight portfolio limits, but the most flexible systems currently are Chile, 
Argentina, Colombia, and Peru (probably in that order).  They are the only countries that permit 
equity and foreign investment (the highest limit on shares is Peru’s of 40 per cent, and on foreign 
assets, Chile’s of 12 per cent).  In Bolivia, although the legislated limits on shares and foreign 
assets have been set at relatively high levels (50-90 and 10-50 per cent, respectively), funds have 
to invest a minimum amount in government bonds.  In the first few months of the system, this was 
set at $180m per annum, only just below the actual flow of funds into the funds.  In general, the 
limits encourage government debt holdings at the expense of equity and foreign assets. 
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Figure 5.  Pension fund portfolio limits, 1998 
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Uruguay and Mexico have the most restrictive regimes, although, as in Bolivia, they are 
supposed to be only temporary.  In Uruguay, pension funds are subject to both minimum and 
maximum limits on investments in government securities. The band is expressed as a percentage of 
the portfolio, and there is a phased program in which the band is to fall from 80-100 per cent in 
1996 to 40-60 per cent in 2000.  The laws allow the amount above the band to be invested in any 
security, but only time deposits have so far been approved. In Mexico, the regulator has so far only 
approved fixed-income instruments (largely government securities).25   
Investment guidelines for pension funds have tended to become more liberal over time, 
permitting and extending investments in equities, foreign assets and less liquid assets, such as real 
estate and venture capital.  The development of the regime in Chile, which has the longest 
experience, is shown in Figure 6.  (Details are in Appendix Table A.5.) 
In general, the domestic investment regime currently in place in Chile, Argentina, Peru, 
Colombia and the new regime to be implemented in Poland is more liberal than in most of the 
OECD countries with statutory portfolio limits.  On the other hand, these same OECD countries 
allow a higher share of the portfolio to be invested in foreign securities, and some also permit 
direct investment in property and lending to affiliates (at least employer pension plans). 
                                                 
25 The Mexican pensions law also requires that funds must invest in securities that encourage national productive activity, 
create infrastructure, generate employment, housing investment, and regional development (article 43). 
Equities Corporate bonds Foreign 
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Figure 6.  Evolution of portfolio limits in Chile, 1982-1998 
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5.1 Rationale of asset allocation regulations 
Two common arguments for controls on international investment26 are first, that they limit 
volatile capital flows and hence achieve monetary sovereignty and macro-economic stability 
(Fontaine, 1997) and secondly, that they reduce capital flight and deepen domestic financial 
markets (Reisen, 1997). These are problems that are particularly relevant for developing countries, 
which would explain why in general the ceiling on investment in foreign securities is lower in these 
countries than in the OECD area. 
Five main arguments have been used to justify domestic portfolio limits 
· lack of experience in fund management and, in particular, the absence of adequate risk 
assessment models mean pension funds take ‘excessive’ risks 
· capital markets lack liquidity and transparency 
· fragile financial markets might jeopardise the sustainability of the pension reform 
· limiting the fund’s overall risk can alleviate the moral-hazard problem caused by government 
pension guarantees 
                                                 
26 See Candia (1998) for a summary.   
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· the transition cost to a funded pension system may be prohibitively high for countries with 
large explicit debt burdens and so can be eased by requiring investment in government bonds 
As with restrictions on industry structure, asset-allocation limits are a way of isolating 
pension assets from agency and systemic risks in capital markets.  The prudent-person rule may 
not be viable where capital-market infrastructure is underdeveloped and prudential controls are 
not properly in place. 
Theoretical models, such as that of Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1996), support the 
government-debt argument to an extent.  But they provide a case for floors on investment in 
government securities, not for ceilings.  If the new pension funds were unwilling to hold the 
explicit debt burden created by the transition from pay-as-you-go to funded financing of pensions, 
interest rates would rise.  This would, in turn, worsen government finances and crowd out private 
investment.27   
All of these arguments apply only temporarily.  Over time, the efficiency and effectiveness 
of fund managers should improve with experience and as prudential standards are adopted and the 
costs of the transition amortised.  Regimes should therefore be relaxed over time and, eventually, 
move towards prudent-person rules.   
 
5.2 Adverse effects of asset allocation regulations 
Limits on asset classes have three main adverse effects: 
· constraints on portfolio diversification create systematic market risk, meaning that higher 
returns can only be achieved at higher relative risk  
· pension funds are more likely to control large shares of the markets in which they can invest, 
creating liquidity problems 
· capital market development might be hindered 
Modern portfolio theory provides the most critical perspective on portfolio limits.  Shah 
(1997) uses a capital-asset-pricing model to show that asset restrictions hamper the ability of fund 
managers to earn the highest possible risk-adjusted return.  Returns as high those in an 
unconstrained system can only be reached with greater risk.  Or, for a given degree of risk, 
retirement income will be lower. This argument is particularly relevant for developing countries, 
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because the range of investment products is typically very limited when the new pension system 
was set-up. Further restricting portfolios can therefore have adverse consequence on the degree of 
risk diversification that can be achieved. 
Market power (the second adverse effect) has become more of a problem as systems 
develop.  Figure 7 shows the percentage of the stockmarket owned by pension funds in a selection 
of OECD and Latin American countries.  Chile comes top among Latin American countries, with 
11 per cent of equities owned by pension funds.  Pension funds account for a third of stocks in the 
United Kingdom, and a quarter in the United States.  In the Netherlands, although pension funds 
are very large, only a quarter is invested in shares (compared with over three-quarters in the United 
Kingdom, for example).  In contrast, Belgian funds’ portfolio is the most heavily weighted in 
equities after Ireland and the United Kingdom, but the pension funds overall assets are relatively 
small.  In other countries, both the funds’ assets and their equity proportions are small.   
The concentration of equity ownership in pension funds’ hands raises a number of issues.  
First, liquidity problems.  Coupled with the herding effect of performance regulation (see above), 
when shifts in asset allocation involve the majority of pension funds buying or selling at the same 
time, market prices can shift strongly (in an adverse direction).  When the Chilean investment 
regime was partially liberalised in 1985, pension funds found it difficult to close their fixed-income 
positions without adversely affecting prices.  Pension funds moved only gradually from fixed-
income instruments into stocks.28  As a result, asset allocations become ossified, and changed only 
slowly in response to liberalisation of the investment regime.  Walker (1993a, 1993b) looks at 
differences in risk-adjusted returns between Chilean funds and finds that smaller funds’ variable 
income portfolios perform better than those of larger ones.  He attributes this to the 7-per-cent 
limit of each company’s shares that funds can hold.  In fixed-income portfolios, he finds no 
significant differences. 
A second important issue arising from the concentration of ownership is corporate 
governance: whether pension funds make effective owners of stocks.  This has been hotly debated 
in the United Kingdom and the United States, where strong movements for ‘shareholder activism’; 
have developed.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
27  See also Holzmann (1998b) on the issue of debt financing of the transition to a funded system.   
28 The jump in the share of the proportion allocated to equities between 1990 and 1991 (from 11 to 24 per cent) is largely 
due to an extraordinary stock market real return of nearly 90 per cent that year. 
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Figure 7.  Pension funds’ equity holdings as a percentage  
of total stockmarket capitalisation, 1997 
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Source: De Ryck (1998); pension fund regulators 
 
 
5.3 Empirical evidence of portfolio limits and asset allocations 
 Asset allocation varies widely across countries.  Appendix Table A.6 compares the 
portfolios of five Latin American countries with a range of OECD countries and two from Asia.  
Figure 8 focuses on the proportion invested in equities.  With the exception of Mexico and 
Uruguay, the Latin American countries all invest above the average (24 per cent) proportion in 
equities.  The highest proportion of funds are invested in equities in the English-speaking 
countries.  In Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the United States, the average equity 
holding is 60 per cent of the fund.  At the other end of the scale are Mexico and Uruguay, which 
have only recently reformed their systems, Singapore, where the provident fund invests mainly in 
bonds, and a number of continental European countries.  The first contributions have only just 
begun to flow into Hungarian pension funds, so most of the assets are currently invested in short-
term deposits.   
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Figure 8.  Equity investments as a percentage of total pension-fund portfolios 
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Source: De Ryck (1998), Mariscal (1998a,b,c,d), Asher (1998) 
 
 
5.3.1. Latin American countries 
 Table 13 shows the structure of portfolios in Argentina, Chile and Peru in June 1997 along 
with the legal maxima by type of instrument.  For some instruments, restrictions have been 
binding.29  Table 14 shows how the relaxation of portfolio restrictions in Chile over time has led to 
                                                 
29  Information refers to aggregate portfolios.  Restrictions do not necessarily require the aggregated amount to coincide with 
the legal upper limit.  Also, individual funds usually establish lower-than-legal upper limits of their own, to avoid incurring 
the costs of asset liquidation when changes in the portfolio are required.  Another reason for lower-than-legal limits in 
Argentina is that the supervisor values the funds, and, in exceptional cases, this may result in differences between official 
prices and those assumed by the pension-fund managers. 
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changes in portfolio composition.  Pension funds have taken advantage of the elimination of the 
ban on investment in equities.  By 1997, they had invested nearly one quarter of their portfolio in 
stocks.  The lowering of the limit on mortgage investments (from 70 per cent of the portfolio in 
1981 to 50 per cent in 1990) had the opposite effect.  However, the dramatic reduction in their 
portfolio share (from 51 per cent in 1983 to 17 per cent in 1997) is largely a consequence of a 
supply constraint.  In 1997, pension funds owned over one half of all mortgages. 
The Table does not indicate the full extent of the impact of regulations on portfolio 
allocation.  Other regulatory controls, such as limits on the concentration of ownership, can create 
a discrepancy between the effective limit to which the funds are subject and the one stipulated in 
legislation.  In Chile, for example, the 7-per-cent limit of a company’s shares that a pension fund 
can own becomes binding for larger funds long before the overall equities limit of 37 per cent 
(Walker, 1993b).  Iglesias (1990) calculated that, because of the 7-per-cent constraint, the 
effective limit on equities for the largest Chilean funds was around 14.8 per cent, compared with 
the overall maximum of 30 per cent at that time.   
Pension funds in Latin America have so far only dipped their toes in the water of 
international markets.  Foreign investment has been permitted in Chile since 1992, but only 1 per 
cent of the portfolio is now invested overseas, mainly via mutual funds. 
 
Table 13.  Pension-fund portfolios and limits in Argentina, Chile and Peru 
Assets Argentina  Chile  Peru 
(% fund) Actual Maximum  Actual Maximum  Actual Maximum 
Public-sector bonds 49 50  38 35/50  12 40 
Private-sector bonds 5 28  4 30/50  16 35 
Certificate of deposit 18 28  8 30/50  34 50 
Equities 22 35  29 35/50  35 30 
Mortgages 0 28  17 35/50  1 40 
Others 6 —  4 —  3 — 
         
Total 100   100   100  
Note: Data relate to June 1997 
Source: Pension fund regulators 
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Table 14.  Asset allocation of funds in Chile, 1981-97 
per cent of funds 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Government bonds 28 26 45 42 42 47 41 35 42 44 38 41 39 40 39 42 40
Mortgages 9 47 51 43 35 26 21 21 18 16 13 14 13 14 16 18 17
Deposits 62 27 3 13 21 23 29 30 22 18 13 11 8 6 7 7 14
Shares  4 6 8 10 11 24 24 32 32 30 25 23
Funds  1 3 3 3
Foreign 1 1 1 1
Corporate bonds 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 6 9 11 11 10 7 6 5 5 3
Source: Superintendencia de Administrados de Fondos de Pensiones 
 
 
5.3.2. OECD countries 
 Table 15 shows portfolios relative to limits for eight OECD countries with quantitative 
investment restrictions (Table 8 above).  In most cases, the limits again do not seem to be binding, 
with the exception of the (soon to be abolished) equity limit in Japan and the (informal) equity 
limit in the Netherlands.  In effect, fund managers in, for example, Germany and Switzerland have 
been far more conservative than the regulations would allow.   
This is also the case in international investment. Even countries with no restrictions invest 
very few assets abroad.  In Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom this proportion exceeds 30 
per cent.  In the United States, the proportion is just 10 per cent.  This effect is termed home bias, 
and there are a number of likely explanations.30   
First, overseas investments imply additional exchange-rate, settlement and liquidity risks.  
While it is possible to hedge such risks, this can be costly and, as recent experience has shown, can 
be difficult in periods of extreme volatility, lack of liquidity or where historic relationships between 
markets break down.  Secondly, pension funds’ liabilities are almost wholly domestic, so it seems 
prudent to match them mainly with domestic assets.  Thirdly, the type of benchmark or yardstick 
orientation of fund managers outlined in section 5.1 may play a role.  Fourthly, the world market 
portfolio, as suggested for pension-fund investment by Kotlikoff (1994), may not be optimal if 
markets are inefficient.31  Moreover, there is also evidence that adverse, downward movements in 
world markets are more correlated than upward.32  Finally, some have argued that increased 
                                                 
30  See Adler and Jorion (1992), French and Poterba (1991), Solnik (1991), Nowakowskic and Ralli (1987) and Candia 
(1998).   
31  Beltratti (1998) and Huel and Cozzini (1990).   
32  Solnik, Boucle and Le Fur (1996).   
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integration of global capital markets mean that the benefits of diversification are decreasing.33  The 
correlation of returns between a broad United States equity index (the Standard and Poors 500) 
and returns in emerging markets was 0.41 in the period 1990-95, compared with 0.27 in 1975-95.34  
A similar effect can be observed between the United States and Latin American markets: the 
correlations were 0.38 in 1990-95 and 0.24 in 1975-95.  Investment returns among the major 
industrial economies are stronger: between Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
the correlations are between 0.54 and 0.62.  One exception is Japan: the correlation with return s 
in the United Kingdom and the United States is around 0.05.35   
 
Table 15.  Portfolios relative to regulations in eight OECD countries 
 Equities Bonds/loans Property Deposits Foreign 
Belgium  +32 -33 0  
Canada     -11 
Denmark -18 +5   -13 
Germany -25  -14  -14 
Japan -3 +11 -18  -23 
Netherlands -7  -4   
Portugal -15  -47  -11 
Switzerland -17  -35  -21 
Source: EFRP (1996) 
 
 
5.4 Empirical evidence of pension fund returns 
 In section 4.2 above we established that individual pension funds in Latin America perform 
very close to the industry average.  We now assess performance of pension funds relative to 
alternative investments.  
 Funded pension systems of the type introduced in Latin America impose considerable 
fiduciary duties on governments.  First, because government mandates contributions.  Secondly, 
because governments set investment allocation limits, and empirical evidence suggests that 90 per 
cent of individual funds’ returns in Latin America can be explained by the investment regime, with 
only 10 per cent attributable to investment managers’ performance.   
In this section, we compare pension fund investment performance with various market 
benchmark indices.  While market benchmark comparison is common in the pension fund industry 
                                                 
33  Kessler (1996), Blommenstien (1998) and OECD (1998).   
34  Source: ICFA.   
35  Holzmann (1998a), Table A.2.   
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in developed countries (especially in defined-benefit schemes), they are as yet rare in Latin 
America.  Absolute returns are often quoted to demonstrate the ‘success’ of the new systems but 
returns can only be judged against alternatives.  The Colombian supervisory agency has established 
its own market index that makes up half of the stipulated pension fund return.  In Bolivia, the 
contract between the government and the pension funds requires a benchmark to be established, 
and permits funds would to raise commissions by 10 per cent if they reach the benchmark.  But the 
government has not so far decided what the benchmark should be.  
 
5.4.1 Latin American countries 
 Table 16 evaluates performance in Chile, Argentina, and Peru against domestic market 
indices (to May 1998).  The IFC index of equity returns comprises 60 per cent of the balanced 
portfolio, with 40 per cent from an index of bond returns.  The Table gives the average annual real 
returns before fees and the standard deviation of returns, a simple measure of volatility.  
 Pension funds only appear to have performed better than the benchmark in Argentina. 
However, it is important to note that around 25 per cent of the assets of Argentine pension funds 
are in an ‘investment account’.  This account, created after the Mexican peso devaluation in 1994, 
allows funds to avoid marking to market fixed income securities that lost significant value during 
the crisis.  Hence, ‘return’ figures for the Argentine pension fund industry should be interpreted 
with caution, since they are likely to be significantly overstated.   
 Pension fund returns in Peru were only half the return of the balanced portfolio and three-
quarters in Chile.  However, the volatility of pension fund returns was much less than the variance 
in the balanced portfolio in all three countries.  It must be remembered, however, that these three 
are the countries with the most liberal investment regimes. In countries with more stringent 
regimes pension funds can be expected to have performed relatively worse36. 
 
                                                 
36  An adequate evaluation of performance in countries like Bolivia, Uruguay, and Mexico cannot be carried out, however, 
because the time period is too short. 
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Table 16.  Returns on pension funds and balanced portfolios: Latin America 
(%) Period Actual return Balanced 
portfolio 
Bond index Equity index 
Argentina 1994-97 11.9 (5.0) 11.5 (15.2) 8.9 (13.1) 12.8 (18.7) 
Chile 1981-97 11.2 (9.0) 15.4 (25.7) 7.6 (1.2) 17.9 (43.3) 
Peru 1993-97 7.7 (3.8) 14.6 (18.9) n/a 14.6 (18.9) 
Note: Balanced domestic portfolio is 40 per cent bonds, 60 per cent equities. Standard 
deviation in parentheses 
Source: Pension Fund Regulators, National Securities Commission, Central Banks, IFC 
 
5.4.2 OECD countries: cross-national comparisons 
Earlier in this section, we showed that OECD countries’ policies can broadly be divided 
between those with prudent-person rules and those with asset limits.  Comparing pension fund 
performance between the two groups of countries can provide some useful evidence on the effect 
of investment regulations.   
 Figure 9 gives data for ten countries.  Four — Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom and the United States — have systems best described as prudent person.  The 
other six have some form of portfolio regulation (although the degree, of course, varies).  The bars 
show actual returns for pension funds, the lines, the returns on a balanced portfolio (50 per cent 
bonds, 50 per cent equities).  Table A.7 in the Appendix gives more details, and some data for 
another five countries.   
On the surface, the prudent-person countries perform significantly better, earning 9½ per 
cent a year, compared with 6½-7 per cent a year in the countries with asset limits.  But this 
analysis is rather superficial for a number of reasons.  First, it ignores risk.  Funds in prudent-
person countries have larger equity portfolios.  Davis (1998) constructs a synthetic rate of return 
for pension funds over the period 1967-90.  He couples data on the portfolio structure of funds in 
different countries with aggregate indices of the return on different asset classes to estimate 
pension funds returns.  (Actual returns of pension funds will differ from this synthetic return.)  
Over this period, the standard deviation of returns in prudent-person countries was 11.1, 
compared with 8.1 in asset-limits countries.  Thus, some of the higher return is bought at the price 
of higher volatility.  Secondly, there may be many other correlated factors that explain the 
difference in returns between the two groups of countries, including other types of regulations, 
macroeconomic policies, taxation, structural factors etc.  But the lines on the Figure, however, 
show that market returns on a balanced portfolio were somewhat lower in prudent-person 
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countries.  Thus, it was pension-fund rather than market performance that differs between the two 
sets of countries.  
 
Figure 9.  Returns on pension funds and balanced 
portfolios: OECD countries 
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Source: OECD (1998), Tables V.2 and V.3, based on EFRP (1996), Pragma 
Consulting, Davis (1998) 
 
5.4.3 United Kingdom and United States 
 Section 5.3.1 showed the rate of return to pension funds in Latin America relative to 
market returns.  A comparable analysis for the United Kingdom and the United States, both of 
which have prudent-person rules rather than asset limits, is instructive.  Lakonishok, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1992) investigated the performance of defined-benefit pension funds relative to the 
Standard & Poors 500 over the period 1983-89.  Weighting each funds return equally, the average 
return fell 1.3 percentage points below the index return of 19 per cent.  Weighting funds by value, 
the under-performance was 2.6 percentage points.  Over the same period, other institutional 
investors, such as mutual funds, outperformed the market.  Since there are no asset limits, this 
under-performance should arise from some other structural factors such as market failure.   
 A similar analysis for the United Kingdom shows marginal underperformance of pension 
funds’ investments in domestic equities of around 0.3 percentage points over the period 1981-91.37  
                                                 
37 Dilnot et al. (1994), section 5.4 and Figure 5.4, based on data from Combined Actuarial Performance Services (1993).   
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Government bond investments also performed at about the market average.  The only significant 
underperformance was in investments in overseas equities, which were three percentage points 
below market indices, reflecting a conservative strategy with foreign investments.   
 The lesson of these analyses is that it is too simplistic to attribute the whole of 
underperformance to investment regulations.  Even in countries with prudent-person rules, there is 
some evidence that pension funds do not achieve market levels of returns.   
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Along with housing, pensions will be the largest asset most workers (at least in developing 
economies) own.  Governments that have mandated pension contributions have a fiduciary 
responsibility and a financial interest (through implicit and explicit guarantees) in ensuring that this 
important component of workers’ savings provides the best possible returns.  Governments have 
used this responsibility to justify Draconian regulations of pension funds’ structure, performance, 
and investment allocation.   
The result of these regulations is that pension funds’ portfolios are very similar and their 
returns practically indistinguishable.  Such regulations provide  little incentive for improved 
efficiencies in investment management. They also fail to offer workers significant portfolio choice. 
Although workers have their individual accounts, they have no real choice over how their 
contributions are invested.  They have little real responsibility for determining their own financial 
future.  A policy implication of the evidence presented in the paper is that investment regimes 
should be liberalised to allow diversification.  Funds should be able to compete in offering 
different risk-return strategies, to allow workers with different degrees of risk aversion and at 
different points in their lifecycle to choose different portfolios. 
Restrictions when a reform is first introduced are probably necessary to bolster confidence 
in the system.  Much of the risk at this point comes not from market volatility, but from systemic 
risk that could lead to the collapse of one or more of the private funds, or indeed, of the whole 
system.  If new financial intermediaries and the restriction of a single fund manager per investor 
are deemed desirable, then performance regulations may also be required to ensure that investors 
in mandatory systems are not exposed to fund manager risk that they cannot diversify away. The 
key policy question then becomes how quickly should the system be liberalised?  In Chile, which 
pioneered this type of reform, the answer was probably fairly slowly.  In countries that have 
reformed more recently, the success of other countries’ models should allow for far more rapid 
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relaxation of investment restrictions.  A medium-term goal should be to allow managers to offer 
different types of funds.  The long-term goal should be to move towards a ‘prudent-person’ rule.  
This kind of regulation also has its faults, but is still preferable to a long-term policy of 
quantitative investment restrictions.   
Governments have a responsibility to ensure that mandatory pension funds are managed 
well.  It is therefore not unnatural that developing countries with a history of poor performance of 
financial institutions err on the side of caution.  Draconian regulations are designed to protect 
pension funds from fragile and underdeveloped financial systems, both in Latin America and in the 
transition economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  These regulations are not cost free, 
however, and it is critical that governments evaluate carefully the impact of the regulations they 
impose, since they can undermine many of the objectives of pension reform.   
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Appendix.  Detailed data tables 
 
Table A.1.  Asset allocation in member-directed 401(k) pension plans 
 Equity of which, own 
employer’s stock 
Bond/money funds Guaranteed 
investment contracts 
20 77 22 14 8 
30 76 26 14 9 
40 72 29 14 12 
50 67 29 15 16 
60 53 28 18 26 
     
Total 68 28 15 15 
Note: investment in balanced funds is allocated 60 per cent to equities and 40 per cent to bonds, in line 
with the Investment Company Institute’s data for the average balanced mutual fund 
Source: VanDerhei et al. (1999) 
 
Table A.2.  Concentration of fund managers  
in Latin America and the United Kingdom 
United Kingdom  Chile  Mexico  Argentina  
Prudential 8.2 Provida/Union 23.2 Bancomer 25.1 Consolidar/Fecunda 18.9 
Mercury 15.8 Habitat 42.5 Banamex 44.8 Origines/Claridad 36.3 
Schroder 23.2 Cuprum 59.8 Inbursa 54.4 Maxima 53.1 
Commercial Union 29.8 Santamaria 72.3 Bital 62.5 Siembra 67.8 
Morgan Grenfell 35.9 Summa/Bansander 84.7 Profuturo 70.2 Previnta 78.0 
Fleming 41.4 Proteccion 94.3 Garante 77.3 Nacion 84.7 
PDFM 46.6 Planvital 96.9 Santander 82.7 Generar 88.8 
Standard Life 51.0 Magister/Qualitas 98.7 XXI 87.9 Arauca Bil 91.8 
INVSECO 55.2 Aporta 99.5 Banorte 92.4 Previsol 94.0 
Norwich Union 59.3 Fomenta 100.0 Bancrecer/Dresdner 95.1 Prorenta/San Jose 96.1 
Legal & General 62.8   Previnter 96.7 Future 98.0 
BZW 66.3   Atlantico-Promex 97.7 Ethika 98.7 
Threadneedle 69.2   Confia-Principal 98.4 Unidos 99.3 
Hill Samuel 72.1   Tepeyac 98.8 Profesion + Auge 99.7 
Note: Columns show the cumulative percentage of total funds under management.  Figures for Argentina 
includes three recently announced mergers (Consolidar/Fecunda, Origines/Claridad, Prorenta/San Jose), as 
does Chile (Provida/Union, Summa/Bansander, Magister/Qualitas) 
Source: Pension fund regulators in Latin America, HSBC James Capel for United Kingdom 
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Table A.3.  Pension asset regulations in OECD countries 
 Domestic International 
Prudent person   
Austria — no limits 
Australia no limits no limits 
Iceland — no foreign investments by public-sector 
funds (e.g. civil servants and fishermen) 
Ireland no limits no limits 
Netherlands no limits (informal 30% limit on equities) no limits 
New Zealand no limits no limits 
Spain — no limits in other OECD countries 
United Kingdom no limits no limits 
United States no limits no limits 
Asset limits   
Belgium Minimum 15% in public bonds, maximum 
40% in property, 10% in deposits 
no foreign investments 
Canada 7% maximum on property tax on foreign assets over 10% 
Czech Republic — no foreign investments 
Denmark Minimum 60% in domestic debt; property, 
equities and mutual funds maximum 40% 
20% limit 
Finland — 20% limit in other EU states (lower limit 
on property, higher on government bonds) 
France minimum 50% in EU public bonds 
(AGIRC/ARRCO) 
minimum 34% in public bonds, 40% limit on 
property and 15% Treasury deposits (insured 
funds) 
no foreign assets (insured funds) 
Germany guidelines: 30% limit on EU equities, 25% 
EU property 
20% limit on foreign assets overall; 6% 
limit on non-EU equities, 6% on non-EU 
bonds 
Greece — 20% limit on domestically based mutual 
funds, which can invest abroad 
Italy limited to public bonds, deposits, property, 
mortgages, investment funds (insured funds) 
no limits 
Japan guidelines (being phased out): 30% limit on 
equities, 20% property; minimum 50% bonds 
30% limit on foreign assets; 10% limit in 
any one country 
Norway 20% limit on equities, 30% on private bonds 
or loans 
no limits 
Portugal minimum 30% in public bonds, 50% limit on 
property 
40% limit 
Poland 20% limit on bank deposits or securities, 
40% in listed equities, 15% in open-ended 
investment funds, 5% in closed-end funds, 
15% in publicly traded municipal bonds, 5% 
in untraded bonds; property, commodity and 
derivatives investments prohibited 
5% limit on foreign assets 
Sweden majority of investments in listed bonds and 
loans 
5-10% limit, depending on type of fund 
Switzerland 30% limit on equities, 55% on property 30% total limit, 30% in foreign bonds, 
25% in foreign equities, property 5% 
Source: Laboul (1992), Davis (1998), EFRP (1996), Watson Wyatt (1997), Chlon, Gora and Rutkowski 
(1998) 
Note: — indicates data are unavailable 
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Table A.4.  Pension fund portfolio limits, 1998 
Asset Argentina Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay 
Government securities (total) 65 50 50 100 30 75-85 
 Federal 50      
 Provincial and municipal 15      
 Central bank     30  
Corporate bonds (total) 40 45 20 35 35 25 
 Long term 28      
 Short term 14   10   
 Convertibles 28 10     
 Privatised firms 14      
Bank bonds   50 10 25 25 
Mortgage-backed securities 28 50 30   30 
Letters of credit  50     
Fixed-term deposits 28 50   30 30 
Short-term margin loans     10  
Repurchase agreements   15    
Shares, public companies 35 37 30 0 20 25 
Shares, workers' shares     20  
Preference shares    10   
Shares, privatised companies 14      
Stock index instruments   5    
Securitised instruments   20    
Primary issues, new ventures    10   
Mutual funds 14 5 5  10 0 
Real estate funds  10     
Venture capital funds  5     
Securitised credit funds  5     
Direct investment funds 10      
Foreign securities (total) 10 12 10 0 5  
 Government securities 10      
 Corporate bonds/shares 7     0 
 Fixed income  12 10    
 Variable income  6     
Hedging instruments 2 9   10  
Note: Argentina: The Nacion pension fund must invest between 20 and 50 per cent (or $300m) in 
provincial and municipal bonds to finance regional projects.  Colombia: a limit of 15 per cent is imposed on 
investment securitised instruments backed by non-admitted assets, real estate and infrastructure 
Source: Pension fund regulators 
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Table A.5.  Evolution of portfolio limits in Chile, 1981-1998 
Asset 1981 1982 1985 1990 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Government securities 100 100 50 45 45 50 50 50 50 
Corporate bonds 60 60 40 40 40 40 45 45 45 
 Convertible   10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Mortgage-backed securities 70 40 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Letters of credit 70 40 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Fixed term deposits 70 40 40 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Shares, public companies   30 30 30 37 37 37 37 
Mutual funds    10 10 10 5 5 5 
Real estate funds    10 10 10 10 10 10 
Venture capital funds      5 5 5 
Securitised credit funds      5 5 5 
Foreign securities     3 9 9 12 12 
 Fixed income      9 9 12 12 
 Variable income      4½ 4½ 6 6 
Hedging instruments      9 9 9 12 
Source: Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones 
 
Table A.6.  Pension fund portfolios, selected countries 
(% of portfolio) Equities Fixed interest 
United Kingdom 78 14 
United States 62 27 
   Ireland 58 30 
Australia 41 15 
Belgium 40 46 
   Brazil 38 38 
Peru  35 60 
Canada 28 48 
Chile 28 68 
Sweden 28 62 
Argentina 27 70 
Denmark 27 63 
Netherlands 26 63 
   Average 24 56 
   Luxembourg 21 61 
   Malaysia 16 55 
Switzerland 14 69 
France 14 38 
Hungary 14 19 
Austria 13 71 
Greece 10 53 
Finland 9 61 
Portugal 9 27 
Germany 8 74 
Italy 8 63 
Spain 5 76 
Singapore 0 70 
Mexico 0 96 
Uruguay 0 100 
Source: De Ryck (1998), Mariscal (1998a,b,c,d), Asher (1998) 
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Table A.7.  Returns on pension funds and balanced 
portfolios: OECD countries 
Annual average, Actual returns Balanced domestic  
real, % 1984-96 1984-93 portfolio 
Prudent person 9.5 9.5 3.4 
Australia   2.7 
Ireland 11.0 10.3 3.8 
Netherlands 8.0 7.7 4.5 
United Kingdom 10.0 10.2 3.8 
United States 9.0 9.7 2.1 
    
Asset limits 6.5 6.9 4.0 
Belgium 9.0 8.8 4.2 
Canada   2.2 
Denmark 6.0 6.3 5.3 
France   5.2 
Germany 7.0 7.2 6.1 
Italy   1.9 
Japan  6.5 5.5 
Spain  7.0  
Sweden  8.1 3.8 
Switzerland 4.0 4.4 2.0 
Note: Balanced domestic portfolio is 50 per cent bonds, 50 per cent 
equities.   
Source: OECD (1998), Tables V.2 and V.3, based on EFRP (1996), Pragma 
Consulting, Davis (1998) 
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